Regulating Surveillance: Suggestions for a Possible Way Forward by Paterson, Moira (author) & (author)
Regulating Surveillance: 
Suggestions for a Possible Way 
Forward
Moira Paterson* 
The need for privacy protection against surveillance has assumed new significance due 
to the onslaught of technological developments that increasingly undermine the capacity 
of individuals to maintain anonymity in relation to public activities and their physical 
movements across public places. Modern surveillance practices arguably require a 
rethinking of some of the tests and assumptions that underlie existing privacy laws, 
including tests based on “reasonable expectations of privacy”, distinctions between content 
and between transactional data and content. They also call for active consideration of 
the full range of regulatory tools available and ways in which those tools can be adapted 
to reduce their existing limitations. This paper draws on a range of privacy resources, 
and on regulatory theory more generally, to suggest possible ways forward.
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I. Introduction
The need for privacy protection against surveillance has assumed new significance due to the onslaught of technological developments 
that increasingly undermine the capacity of individuals to maintain 
anonymity in relation to public activities and their physical movements 
across public places. Two examples are illustrative of this trend.
The first is the FaceSDK application, which is advertised as enabling 
developers using a variety of computing languages to build platforms 
based on face recognition. This is described as being “used in hundreds 
of applications for identifying and authenticating users with webcams, 
looking up matching faces in photo databases, automatically detecting 
facial features in graphic editors, and detecting faces on still images and 
video streams in real-time”.1
The second is a recently developed “IMSI catcher” device, which 
is described as “a low-cost way to discover the precise location of 
1. See Luxand Inc, “Detect and Recognize Faces with Luxand FaceSDK” 
Luxand, online: Luxand <https://www.luxand.com/facesdk/>.
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smartphones using the latest LTE standard2 for mobile networks”3 and 
as being able to “track users for days with little indication anything is 
amiss”.4
What is significant about technologies of this type is that they make 
it increasingly easy to extract or infer identity from non-identifying signs 
and information. This amounts to an unprecedented assault on anonymity, 
making it increasingly difficult for individuals, other than hermits, to 
go about their lives beyond the reach of others. More specifically, these 
technologies make it difficult for individuals to keep at bay the uncalled 
for reactions and consequences that result from being known to and 
accessible by random and unknown individuals and entities who use the 
aforementioned devices and applications.
The implications of technology-assisted surveillance activities have, 
to date, been considered most closely in the context of surveillance by 
law enforcement and national security bodies. They have also received 
some scrutiny in the online context. However, it is arguable that there is 
also a need to regulate surveillance more generally, especially as it relates 
to public places. 
Across the board surveillance is important because surveillance and 
the possible privacy harm to which it may give rise are no longer solely 
the main provinces of law enforcement and national security bodies; 
surveillance now underlies many of the decision-making processes 
of businesses in relation to current and prospective customers and 
employees, and it is increasingly within the reach of private individuals 
as discussed below. The regulation of surveillance more generally is also 
important because of the erosion of the boundaries between public 
2. The Long Term Evaluation Standard is a 4G mobile communications 
standard for high-speed wireless communication for mobile phones 
and data terminal: See “LTE (telecommunication)” Wikipedia (11 
November 2017), online: Wikipedia <https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
LTE_(telecommunication)>.
3. Dan Goodin, “Low-cost IMSI catcher for 4G/LTE networks tracks 
phones’ precise locations” Ars Technica (28 October 2015), online: Ars 
Technica <arstechnica.com/security/2015/10/low-cost-imsi-catcher-for-
4glte-networks-track-phones-precise-locations/>.
4. Ibid.
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and private surveillance. As made clear most recently by the revelations 
of Edward Snowden, private sector organisations are in many ways 
complicit in surveillance activities by national security organisations. This 
means that personal data collected within the private sector provides an 
additional pool of information for law enforcement and national security 
organisations to utilise.5
Modern surveillance practices arguably require a rethinking of some 
of the tests and assumptions that underlie existing privacy laws, including 
tests based on “reasonable expectations of privacy”, distinctions between 
content, and between transactional data and content. They also call for 
active consideration of the full range of regulatory tools available and 
ways in which they can be adapted to reduce their existing limitations. 
This paper draws on a range of privacy resources, and on regulatory 
theory more generally, to suggest possible ways forward.
II. The Problem of Privacy in Public Places
Public place privacy has become a major issue due to technological 
developments that facilitate “round the clock” surveillance, evolving 
social practices that increase the amount of information disclosed by 
individuals about themselves and changes in the decision-making 
practices of businesses and government agencies involving information 
obtained via directed, ongoing surveillance as a basis for making decisions 
about individuals. These are increasingly combining to create what has 
been described as “seamless, real-time surveillance”.6 
The link between technology and issues of privacy is by no means 
5. See e.g. Ewen MacAskill & Dominic Rushe “Snowden document reveals 
key role of companies in NSA data collection” The Guardian (1 November 
2013), online: The Guardian <www.theguardian.com/world/2013/
nov/01/nsa-data-collection-tech-firms>. This threat is arguably amplified 
to the extent that countries impose compulsory data retention regimes. 
For useful discussion of the Australian context see Dan Svantesson, 
“Systematic Government Access to Private-Sector Data in Australia” 
(2012) 2:4 International Data Privacy Law 268.
6. Edem Williams & Bassey Eyo, “Ubiquitous Computing: The Technology 
for Boundless Surveillance” (2012) 3:9 International Journal of Scientific 
& Engineering Research 1 at 2.
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new. Early concerns about effects on privacy were highlighted by Warren 
and Brandeis back in 1890.7 They related to “instantaneous photographs” 
and numerous mechanical devices that threatened to make good the 
prediction that “what is whispered in the closet shall be proclaimed from 
the house-tops”.8
The impact of technology accelerated in the latter part of the 20th 
century with the advent of digitisation and the convergence that it 
facilitated, as well as developments such as the increased use of loyalty 
cards and closed circuit television (“CCTV”) cameras.9 It has accelerated 
even further in the new millennium due, in particular, to three trends: 
(1) the proliferation of Radio Frequency Identification (“RFID”) that 
facilitates comprehensive but unobtrusive ‘round the clock’ surveillance 
via its use, for example, on freeway transponders and public transport 
swipe cards; (2) the increased use of Global Positioning Systems (“GPS”) 
to collect data about individuals’ geographical locations across time, 
thereby creating detailed profiles not only of an individual’s movements 
but also of their interrelationships with others; and (3) advances in 
imaging algorithms (for example, those used for face recognition and 
automatic number plate recognition), which facilitate the automated 
operation of CCTV networks and other visual surveillance activities.10
These technologies are converging and being combined to create 
powerful, networked surveillance systems that come close to realising 
Weiser’s vision of a new era of ubiquitous computing (“ubicomp”). 
This ubicomp era is one in which computer technology would become 
embedded in all aspects of daily life and computing would increasingly 
“move to the background, weave itself into the fabric of everyday living 
7. Samuel D Warren & Louis D Brandeis, “The Right to Privacy” (1890) 4:5 
Harvard Law Review 193.
8. Ibid at 195.
9. For a useful overview of these and other early technology-related issues 
see Australian Law Reform Commission, Review of Australian Privacy Law 
(Discussion Paper No 72) (ALRC 2007) ch 6 (September 2007), online: 
ALRC <https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/pdfs/publications/
DP72_full.pdf>.
10. See e.g. Christopher Kuner et al, “Face-to-data — Another Developing 
Privacy Threat?” (2013) 3:1 International Data Privacy Law 1.
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spaces and disappear from the foreground, projecting the human user 
into it”.11 The coupling of RFID technology with internet developments 
heralds the development of a new “Internet of Things” in which networked 
controls, sensors and devices for collecting data will increasingly be 
built into common gadgets, including household appliances, cars and 
the power grid, permitting “connectivity for anything”.12 The Internet 
of Things allows further profiling of individuals via the inanimate 
things with which they are associated by “subjecting more and more 
previously unobservable activity to electronic measurement, observation, 
and control”.13 Examples of this development include technologies for 
monitoring home wearable computing devices,14 tools used by individuals 
to track their health and fitness and smart power devices.15 Moreover, 
“innovation in this space is already occurring at an extremely rapid pace, 
thanks to the same underlying drivers of the Internet economy, namely 
11. Maja Pantic et al, Human Computing and Machine Understanding of 
Human Behavior: A Survey: Proceedings of the 8th International Conference 
on Multimodal Interfaces, Banff, 2006 (New York: ACM Publications, 
2006) 239.
12. Marianna Tafich, “The Internet of Things: Application Domains” in 
Eckehard Steinbach et el, eds, Advances in Media Technology: Internet of 
Things (Technische Universität München, 2013) at 37 (15 January 2013), 
online: Advances in Media Technology <citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/
download?doi=10.1.1.395.23&rep=rep1&type=pdf>.
13. Neil M Richards, “The Dangers of Surveillance” (2013) 126:7 Harvard 
Law Review 1934 at 1940.
14. See Melanie Swan, “Sensor Mania! The Internet of Things, Wearable 
Computing, Objective Metrics, and the Quantified Self 2.0” (2012) 1:3 
Journal of Sensor and Actuator Networks 217.
15. See Joseph Savirimuthu, “Smart Meters and the Information Panopticon: 
Beyond the Rhetoric of Compliance” (2013) 27:1–2 International Review 
of Law, Computers & Technology 161.
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Moore’s Law16 and Metcalfe’s Law”.17
Developments that facilitate surveillance have a close interrelationship 
with decision-making practices. Surveillance technology opens up new 
possibilities for making use of data, while the increasingly voracious 
appetite for personal data is fuelling further technological innovation. As 
noted by Lyon, vast quantities of data are collected, stored and assessed 
to create profiles and risk categories with an aim toward planning, 
predicting and preventing “by classifying and assessing those profiles and 
risks”.18 This allows for more streamlined and better-targeted decision-
making, but it also facilitates a level of “social sorting” that is both non-
transparent and potentially discriminatory. 
While these practices are by no means new, they have been taken a 
step further via the use of algorithms to mine the vast pools of data that 
are now available for analysis. As explained by Zarsky, these algorithms 
are used “to reveal association rules and clusters within the data that 
might not have been apparent to the analyst initially sifting through the 
information”, producing results that are unpredictable for the analyst 
and the data subjects and facilitating the revelation of more patterns and 
16. As described by Ian Brown, “Computer processing power is expected to 
continue following Moore’s Law, doubling every 18–24 months — at least 
thirty-fold in the next decade, although by that point the fundamental 
limits of silicon engineering will be approaching”: UK, Government 
Office for Science, Future Identities: Changing Identities in the UK: The 
Next 10 Years – full report, by Ian Brown, DR 5 (London: Foresight Future 
Identities, 2013), 1.2. 
17. Adam Thierer, “Privacy and Security Implications of the Internet 
of Things” Social Science Research Network (1 June 2013), online: 
SSRN <www.ssrn.com/abstract=2273031>, at 3, n 20, citing Michael 
Chui, Markus Löffler & Roger Roberts, “The Internet of Things” 
McKinsey Quarterly (March 2010), online: McKinsey & Company <www.
mckinsey.com/industries/high-tech/our-insights/the-internet-of-things>.
18. See David Lyon, “Surveillance as Social Sorting: Computer Codes and 
Mobile Bodies” in David Lyon, ed, Surveillance as Social Sorting: Privacy, 
Risk and Digital Discrimination (London: Routledge, 2003) at 13. 
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correlations.19 These techniques are used to mine “Big Data”; that is, 
“datasets whose size is beyond the ability of typical database software to 
capture, store, manage, and analyse”.20
III. Why Loss of Anonymity Requires Attention
Technology-facilitated surveillance is arguably a problem because it 
undermines the ability of individuals to remain anonymous beyond the 
narrow confines of private places. This, in turn, makes them potentially 
vulnerable to a range of harms, ranging from behavioural manipulation 
through to exploitation, discrimination, identity theft and stalking.
Lack of public place privacy is problematic for reasons similar to those 
which were identified by privacy advocates when considering the impact 
of the convergence of computer and telecommunications technologies.21 
These analyses focused on issues of human autonomy and dignity, the use 
of personal information as a basis for the exercise of power and the lack 
of dignity inherent in treating individuals as composites of their collated 
data;22 they emphasised the important social dimension of anonymity 
and its role in protecting processes of self-definition and individuation.23 
Modern observational and information collection activities 
undermine anonymity by making it difficult, if not impossible, to 
engage in any publicly observable activities free from identification 
and surveillance. In doing so they create “a new kind of knowledge … 
19. Tal Z Zarsky, “Desperately Seeking Solutions: Using Implementation-Based 
Solutions for the Troubles of Information Privacy in the Age of Data 
Mining and the Internet Society” (2004) 56:1 Maine Law Review 13 at 
27.
20. James Manyika et al, Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, 
Competition, and Productivity (McKinsey Global Institute, 2011) at 1.
21. See e.g. Moira Paterson, “Privacy Protection in Australia: The Need for an 
Effective Private Sector Regime” (1988) 26:2 Federal Law Review 371.
22. Austl, Commonwealth, Victorian Law Reform Commission, Defining 
Privacy (Occasional Paper) by Kate Foord (Melbourne: Victorian Law 
Reform Commission, 2002) at 3.
23. See Jo Ann Oravec, “The Transformation of Privacy and Anonymity: 
Beyond the Right to be Let Alone” (2003) 39:1 Sociological Imagination 
3.
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which is re-ordered, codified and made legible to rational, algorithmic 
understanding”24 that in turn creates “an ability not only to define 
‘normal’ behavior, but to spot ‘abnormal’ behaviour through profiling 
techniques”.25
Haggerty and Ericson’s concept of the “surveillant assemblage”26 
provides a useful device for understanding the nature of the surveillance 
practices that have arisen in response to the surveillance potential of new 
technologies. This complex system arises due to the converging interests 
of multiple public and private bodies in establishing credentials (for 
example, identity and other personal attributes) and surveillance systems 
to provide for ways to differentiate amongst unknown strangers. This 
system is designed to improve the efficiency of decision-making, but it 
is problematic to the extent that “[l]ack of public anonymity promotes 
conformity and an oppressive society”,27 and it encourages blandness and 
conformity, leading to “a blunting and blurring of rough edges and sharp 
lines”.28
An alternative metaphor, suggested by Solove, is Kafka’s The Trial, 
which highlights the issue of lack of control over information in a context 
where bureaucratic decisions are increasingly based on dehumanised 
information processing.29 This metaphor is useful in emphasising 
that surveillance can be dangerous and oppressive, even where the 
intentions that underlie it are inherently benign. The danger lies in the 
use of surveillance as a basis for automated decision-making and the 
24. David J Phillips, “Beyond Privacy: Confronting Locational Surveillance in 
Wireless Communication” (2003) 8:1 Communications Law & Policy 1 
at 18.
25. Ibid.
26. Kevin D Haggerty & Richard V Ericson, “The Surveillance Assemblage” 
(2000) 51:4 British Journal of Sociology 605.
27. Christopher Slobogin, “Public Privacy: Camera Surveillance of Public 
Places and the Right to Anonymity” (2002) 72:1 Mississippi Law Journal 
213 at 240.
28. Julie Cohen, “Examined Lives: Informational Privacy and the Subject as 
Object” (2000) 52:5 Stanford Law Review 1373 at 1426.
29. Daniel J Solove, The Digital Person: Technology and Privacy in the 
Information Age (New York: New York University Press, 2004) at 36–39.
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oppressiveness that this can create in contexts where the individual is 
unaware of what is being collected and of the potential consequences 
that might follow.
The end result is what Cohen describes as a process of modulation: 
“a set of processes in which the quality and content of surveillant 
attention is continually modified according to the subject’s own behavior, 
sometimes in response to inputs from the subject but according to logics 
that ultimately are outside the subject’s control”.30 As she explains, the 
very ordinariness of this process makes it extremely powerful, producing 
citizens who are very different from those which form the basis for the 
traditional liberal democratic tradition; lack of privacy deprives them of 
the breathing space to engage in socially situated processes of boundary 
management, thereby ensuring that “the development of subjectivity and 
the development of communal values do not proceed in lockstep”.31 This 
process is not only harmful to individual autonomy but also at odds with 
broader public policy goals relating to liberal democratic citizenship and 
innovation.
IV. Existing Regulatory Frameworks and Their 
Shortcomings
The key regulatory frameworks that are currently used to regulate 
aspects of surveillance fall into four broad groups; (1) laws that regulate 
interception of communications; (2) laws that regulate the uses of specific 
surveillance devices, including listening devices; (3) data protection 
and other laws that require compliance with fair information handling 
principles; and (4) common law and statutory rights to sue in the courts.
These frameworks all suffer from a similar shortcoming to that 
observed by Solove in relation to the United States laws that regulate 
electronic surveillance: “[t]he degree of protection against certain forms 
30. Julie Cohen, “What Privacy is For” (2013) 126:7 Harvard Law Review 
1904 at 1915 [Cohen, “What Privacy is For”].
31. Ibid at 1911, citing Julie Cohen, Configuring the Networked Self: Law, 
Code, and the Play of Everyday Practice (New Haven: Yale University Press, 
2012) at 150.
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of surveillance often does not turn on how problematic or invasive it 
is, but on the technicalities of how the surveillance fits into the law’s 
structure”.32
A. Telecommunications Interception Laws
Surveillance involving the interception of telecommunications (including 
the accessing of communications stored within telecommunications 
systems) is generally regulated by telecommunications interception laws. 
These typically permit law enforcement and national security bodies to 
intercept telecommunications in specific circumstances, while making 
interception otherwise illegal. 
In Australia, the Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 
prohibits: intercepting a “real-time” communication passing over the 
telecommunications system;33 accessing an electronic communication 
such as an email, Small Message Service or voicemail message while it is 
stored on a telecommunications carrier’s (including an Internet Service 
Provider’s) equipment;34 and communicating or otherwise dealing with 
illegally intercepted information.35 These offences carry substantial 
criminal sanctions. The term “interception” is defined as listening to or 
recording a conversation by any means without the knowledge of the 
person making the communication.36 
32. Daniel J Solove, “Reconstructing Electronic Surveillance Law” (2003) 
72:6 The George Washington Law Review 1264 at 1298.
33. Telecommunications (Interception and Access) Act 1979 (Cth) (Austl), ss 
7(1), 105. 
34. This prohibition applies in circumstances where that message cannot 
be accessed on that equipment by a person who is not a party to the 
communication, without the assistance of an employee of the carrier: Ibid, 
ss 5(1) (“stored communication”), 108. 
35. Ibid, ss 63, 108(1).
36. Ibid, s 6(1) (“interception”).
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The equivalent federal legislation in the United States37 makes it a 
federal crime for any person to intentionally intercept (or endeavour 
to intercept) wire, oral or electronic communications by using an 
electronic, mechanical or other device,38 or to intentionally access 
without authorisation (or to exceed an authorisation to access) a facility 
through which an electronic communication service is provided and 
thereby obtain, alter, or prevent authorised access to a wire or electronic 
communication while it is in electronic storage in such a facility.39 The 
term “interception” is defined as the “aural or other acquisition” of the 
contents of various kinds of communications by means of “electronic, 
mechanical or other devices”,40 and the prohibition applies both to 
“electronic communications”, which encompass most radio and data 
transmissions and any communication from a tracking device,41 and 
“oral communications”, which include any face-to-face conversations for 
which the speakers have a justifiable expectation of privacy.42 
In the case of Canada, the Criminal Code makes it an offence for 
37. These are supplemented by state wiretap laws that are mostly directed 
at telephone conversations. For example, it is illegal in California to 
record or eavesdrop on any confidential communication, including a 
private conversation or telephone call, without the consent of all parties 
to the conversation: California Penal Code, PEN § 632 (2017) (US); The 
Citizen Media Law Project provides some selected summaries of state 
recording laws: The Citizen Media Law Project, “State Law: Recording” 
Digital Media Law Project (2 March 2008), online: Berkman Center 
for Internet & Society <www.citmedialaw.org/legal-guide/state-law-
recording>; there is also a full list of state wiretap laws on the website of 
the National Conference for State Legislatures at: “Electronic Surveillance 
Laws” National Conference of State Legislatures (23 March 2012), online: 
NCSL <www.ncsl.org/programs/lis/ CIP/surveillance.htm> [Electronic 
Surveillance Laws].
38. Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 18 USC § 2511(1) (2006).
39. Stored Communications Act 1986, 18 USC § 2701(a) (2006).
40. Ibid, § 2510(4).
41. “Tracking Device” is defined in ibid, § 3117(b) as “an electronic or 
mechanical device which permits the tracking of the movement of a 
person or object’”.
42. Ibid, § 2510(2). The meaning of “oral communications” is discussed in 
United States v Larios, 593 F Supp (3d) 82 at 92 (1st Cir 2010) (US).
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anyone to “by means of any electro-magnetic, acoustic, mechanical 
or other device wilfully [intercept] a private communication”.43 The 
term “private communication” is defined broadly to include any oral 
communication or telecommunication, including “any radio-based 
telephone communication that is treated electronically or otherwise 
for the purpose of preventing intelligible reception by any person other 
than the person intended by the originator to receive it”.44 Interception 
includes listening to, recording or acquiring a communication, or 
acquiring its substance, meaning or purport.45 
Interception laws provide valuable protection for communications 
that take place over telecommunications systems, but they commonly 
suffer from two key defects. The first is that, in countries such as 
Australia and the United States, they protect only communications that 
involve the use of telecommunications systems, as opposed to, say, oral 
communications or communications via Bluetooth technology. They 
also typically offer differential protection based on artificial distinctions 
between transactional and content data, with the former receiving a 
much lower level of, or no, protection based on the increasingly incorrect 
assumption that transactional data is inherently less privacy invasive than 
communicative content.46
However, the nature and extent of metadata that can now be collected 
means that it can be as, or even more, revealing than content data. As 
noted by a former Ontario Information and Privacy Commissioner:
Access to [metadata] will reveal the details of our personal, political, social, 
financial, and working lives. It provides the raw material for the creation of 
detailed, comprehensive, time-stamped map-lines of who is communicating 
with whom, when, how often, and for how long; where the senders and 
recipients are located; who else is connected to whom, and so forth.47
Research conducted at Stanford illustrates the potentially revealing nature 
43. Criminal Code, RSC 1985, c C-46, s 184(1).
44. Ibid, s 183.
45. Ibid.
46. Ibid.
47. Office of the Ontario Privacy Commissioner, “A Primer on Metadata: 
Separating Fact from Fiction”, by Ann Cavoukian, PhD, Information and 
Privacy Commissioner (Ontario: IPC, July 2013) at 12.
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of metadata. The study involved 546 participants who ran an application 
on their cell phones that submitted device logs and social network 
information for analysis.48 In analysing their results, the researchers 
commented that the degree of sensitivity relating to persons and 
organisations contacted by the participants had taken them aback. The 
persons contacted included “Alcoholics Anonymous, gun stores, NARAL 
Pro-Choice, labor unions, divorce lawyers, sexually transmitted disease 
clinics, a Canadian import pharmacy, strip clubs, and much more”.49 
The researchers also discussed potential inferences that could be made 
from patterns of calls and referred to a number of examples, including 
a participant who had communicated with “multiple local neurology 
groups, a specialty pharmacy, a rare condition management service and 
a hotline for a pharmaceutical used solely to treat relapsing multiple 
sclerosis”50 and another who in the space of three weeks “contacted a 
home improvement store, locksmiths, a hydroponics dealer, and a head 
shop”.51 
B. Surveillance Device Laws: Listening Devices and 
Beyond
Surveillance devices laws offer protection against specific uses of 
surveillance devices. They generally regulate uses of listening devices but 
may also extend more broadly to other categories of devices, including 
those used to track the location of individuals and items with which they 
are associated (such as cars) and optical surveillance devices, including 
CCTV cameras. 
48. “What’s in Your Metadata?” The Center for Internet and Society 
(2013), online: Stanford Law School <https://cyberlaw.stanford.edu/
blog/2013/11/what%27s-in-your-metadata>.
49. Jonathan Mayer & Patrick Mutchler, “MetaPhone: The Sensitivity of 
Telephone Metadata” Web Policy (blog) (12 March 2014), online: Web 
Policy <www.webpolicy.org/2014/03/12/metaphone-the-sensitivity-of-
telephone-metadata/>.
50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. “Head shop” is a colloquial expression used to describe an enterprise 
that retails items used for the consumption of cannabis or related to the 
cannabis culture.
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In the case of the United States, surveillance device regulation is not 
the norm, and listening is regulated primarily via interception laws, as 
discussed above, although a small number of states impose restrictions 
on visual surveillance.52 For example, the Georgia Penal Code makes it 
an offence to “to observe, photograph, or record the activities of another 
which occur in any private place and out of public view”.53
In contrast, surveillance device laws are commonplace at the state 
and territory levels in Australia.54 For example, the Victorian Surveillance 
Devices Act contains general prohibitions against the use of listening 
devices, optical surveillance devices and tracking devices.55 As in the case 
of telecommunications interception, these are subject to exceptions in 
respect of authorised activities of law enforcement and national security 
bodies. These are also subject to a number of restrictions that limit their 
operation in public places. For example, the listening device prohibition 
is limited by reference to a test based on reasonable expectation of 
being overheard,56 the optical surveillance prohibition is limited in its 
application to surveillance of indoor activities and by reference to a test 
based on reasonable expectation of being seen57 and the definition of 
52. The website of the National Conference for State Legislatures at Electronic 
Surveillance Laws, supra note 37, contains details of state laws which 
impose restrictions on visual surveillance. 
53. 11 Ga Code Ann tit 16 § 16-11-62 (2010) (US). This prohibition is 
subject to a number of exceptions set out in paras (A)–(C). 
54. Listening Devices Act 1992 (ACT) (Austl); Surveillance Devices Act 2007 
(NSW) (Austl); Surveillance Devices Act (NT) (Austl); Invasion of Privacy 
Act 1971 (Qld) (Austl); Listening and Surveillance Devices Act 2016 (SA) 
(Austl); Listening Devices Act 1991 (Tas) (Austl); Surveillance Devices Act 
1999 (Vic) (Austl); and Surveillance Devices Act 1998 (WA) (Austl).
55. Surveillance Devices Act 1999 (Vic) (Austl), ss 6–8. Section 9 also contains 
a prohibition against the use of “data surveillance devices” (see definition 
in s 3(1)) but this is limited in its application to law enforcement officers. 
The prohibitions in these sections related to the installation, use and 
maintenance of surveillance devices and are supplemented by further 
prohibitions in ss 11 and 12 against the communication and publication 
of data wrongfully obtained via use of surveillance devices.
56. Ibid, ss 3(1) (definition of “private conversation”), 6(1).
57. Ibid, ss 3(1) (definition of “private activity”), 7(1).
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tracking device is limited to devices designed solely for tracking58 (so does 
not therefore apply, for example, to cell phones). 
These tests are based on assumptions that are arguably no longer 
appropriate due to technological developments. For example, the fact 
that one might reasonably expect to be seen by a random passer-by does 
not mean that one should expect to be photographed by a distant camera 
equipped with face recognition technology. As observed by Boa in 
relation to common law tests based on reasonable expectations of privacy, 
“[t]echnological capabilities and the resulting information practices are 
constantly changing. As a result, social norms of what is reasonable have 
not been, and arguably cannot be, established”.59 
In the case of Canada, specific regulation of surveillance devices 
is likewise not the norm and listening is regulated primarily via the 
prohibition against interception discussed above. In addition, various 
uses of surveillance devices, including optical surveillance devices60 and 
the use of GPS tracking devices,61 have been held to qualify as searches, 
although their reasonableness will depend on the specific context.
Surveillance device laws have the advantage of being tied specifically 
to the devices used for surveillance but, even to the extent that they 
are comprehensive in terms of the types of devices covered, these laws 
generally offer minimal protection against surveillance in public places 
due to the inherent problems in finding tests that capture what matters 
without encroaching unduly on other competing interests. They may 
also be of limited assistance to the extent that they fail to encompass the 
full spectrum of devices that may potentially be used for the purposes of 
surveillance.
This issue arises most acutely in relation to optical surveillance 
devices due to the need to ensure that they do not impact adversely 
58. Ibid, ss 3(1) (definition of “tracking device”), 8(1).
59. Kristin Boa, “Privacy Outside the Castle: Surveillance Technologies and 
Reasonable Expectations of Privacy in Canadian Judicial Reasoning” in 
David Matheson, ed, Contours of Privacy (Newcastle: Cambridge Scholars, 
2009) 241 at 244.
60. R v Wong, [1990] 3 SCR 36 at para 61.
61. R v Wise, [1992] 1 SCR 527.
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on legitimate uses of cameras. Abandonment of tests based on indoor/
outdoor distinctions and reasonable expectations of being seen, raises 
the issue of how to distinguish between activities that are legitimate (for 
example, taking a photograph for personal or artistic purposes) and those 
that should be prohibited (for example, surreptitious filming of activities 
that are clearly private in nature such as long lens filming of a couple 
making love in a location that is secluded but outdoors). 
C. Common Law and Statutory Rights of Action for 
Breaches of Privacy
Common law and statutory rights of action fall into two main groups. 
The first comprises common law rights of action based on some or all of 
the four United States privacy torts set out in the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts;62 these also form the basis for most statutory rights of action in 
Canada.63 The second is the extended action for breach of confidence, 
which has been developed by courts in the United Kingdom64 and is 
62. Restatement (Second) of Torts (Washington DC: American Law Institute, 
1977) at §§ 657B-E [American Law Institute]; intrusion upon seclusion, 
appropriation of name or likeness, publicity given to private life and 
publicity placing person in false light.
63. For example, the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Saskatchewan, 
Manitoba, and Newfoundland and Labrador all have statutory privacy 
torts: see Privacy Act, RSBC 1996, c 373; The Privacy Act, RSS 1978, 
c P-24; The Privacy Act, RSM 1987, c P-125; An Act Respecting the 
Protection of Personal Privacy, RSNL 1990, c P-22; together referred to as 
[“Canadian Provincial Statutory Privacy Torts”].
64. For example, this is seen in the leading cases of Campbell v MGN Ltd, 
[2004] UKHL 22 [Campbell], and Mosley v News Group Newspapers Ltd, 
[2008] EWHC 1777 (QB).
18 
 
Paterson, Regulating Surveillance
currently under active consideration in Australia.65 
In the case of the former, the intrusion tort is more obviously 
directed to the regulation of surveillance, as it focuses on the invasion 
of the private sphere (rather than on the publication of personal data)66 
and has been interpreted as being capable of extending to surveillance 
conducted in public places.67 However, while it creates less obvious First 
Amendment issues than the public disclosure tort, it has nevertheless 
been construed, at least in some cases, as being subject to newsworthiness 
privilege.68 The intrusion tort has been recognised recently in Canada69 
and New Zealand,70 although it remains unclear to what extent it will 
be recognised as applying to public place surveillance. There are also a 
number of jurisdictions that have statutory intrusion torts.71
The other privacy tort that may be indirectly relevant is the public 
disclosure tort, which regulates the public disclosure of private facts, 
including those acquired via surveillance. However, this is generally of 
65. In Australian Broadcasting Corporation v Lenah Game Meats, [2001] 
HCA 63, Gleeson CJ supported an extension of the action of breach 
of confidence to protect private information. While that court has yet 
awarded relief on this basis, the decision of the Victorian Court of Appeal 
in Giller v Procopets, [2008] VSCA 236 (Austl), has arguably further paved 
the way for such a development by following English case law in deciding 
that damages for breach of confidence can be awarded for mental distress 
falling short of psychiatric injury.
66. See Adam J Tutaj, “Intrusion Upon Seclusion: Bringing an ‘Otherwise’ 
Valid Cause of Action into the 21st Century” (1999) 82:3 Marquette Law 
Review 665.
67. See e.g. Wolfson v Lewis, 924 F Supp 1413 at 1433–35 (Dist Ct Pa 1996) 
(US). See further, Carmin L Crisci, “All the World is Not a Stage: Finding 
a Right to Privacy in Existing and Proposed Legislation” (2002) 6:1 New 
York University Journal of Legislation & Public Policy 207 at 228–30.
68. See Dempsey v National Enquirer, 702 F Supp 927 at 930–31 (Dist Ct Me 
1988) (US). For further examples see Lyrissa B Lidsky, “Prying, Spying, 
and Lying: Intrusive Newsgathering and What the Law Should Do About 
It” (1999) 73:1 Tulane Law Review 173 at 209, n 187.
69. Jones v Tsige, 2012 ONCA 32.
70. C v Holland, [2012] NZHC 2155.
71. See e.g. Canadian Provincial Statutory Privacy Torts, supra note 63; 
American Law Institute, supra note 62.
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limited assistance in relation to public place surveillance as it runs directly 
into conflict with freedom of expression/speech. This is a major problem 
in the United States due to the strength of First Amendment protection 
but is also an issue in New Zealand, which recognises a similar tort.72
It is also problematic to the extent that it contains an offensiveness test 
that relates to the information disseminated, as opposed to the method 
by which it was obtained, and ignores the dignitary harm resulting from 
the surveillance activities that underpin the disclosure. This issue has 
attracted discussion in New Zealand in the aftermath of the decision 
in Andrews v Television New Zealand73 in which the court declined to 
award relief in respect of the broadcast of footage of the plaintiffs being 
extracted from the wreckage of their car, even though the court found 
that they had a reasonable expectation of privacy in relation to their 
conversations with each other.74
The extended action for breach of confidence demonstrably provides 
better protection for privacy in public places.75 However, as currently 
formulated, it requires the disclosure of personal information and is 
therefore not inherently suited to the regulation of surveillance per se. 
Moreover, it does not regulate surveillance, however intrusive on privacy, 
if the information acquired is not disclosed to other persons.
More generally, it is arguable that privacy-based rights of action have 
the advantage of focussing squarely on the interest that is in issue, but they 
create difficulty because of the nebulous nature of privacy as a concept 
and the fact that it generally rubs up against other competing rights. The 
72. See Moira Paterson, “Criminal Records, Spent Convictions and Privacy: A 
Trans-Tasman Comparison” (2011) 69:1 New Zealand Law Review 69 at 
74–76.
73. Andrews v Television New Zealand, [2009] 1 NZLR 220 (HC).
74. For a useful critique on the New Zealand tort see Nicole A Moreham, 
“Why is Privacy Important? Privacy, Dignity and Development of 
New Zealand Breach of Privacy Tort” in Jeremy Finn & Stephen Todd, 
eds, Law, Liberty, Legislation: Essays in Honour of John Burrows, QC 
(Wellington: LexisNexis, 2008), online: Victoria University of Wellington 
<www.victoria.ac.nz/law/pdf/nm-law-liberty-legislation.pdf>.
75. This is evident from the outcomes in Campbell, supra note 64, and Murray 
v Big Pictures (UK) Ltd, [2008] EWCA Civ 446.
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problem, therefore, lies in devising a test that is sufficiently certain and at 
the same time strikes an appropriate balance between privacy and other 
competing rights, such as freedom of expression/speech. 
D. Data Protection Laws and Other Laws Based on Fair 
Information Practices (“FIPs”)
Data protection laws protect privacy by requiring compliance with 
FIP-based rules that regulate the handling of personal information. 
They are relevant to surveillance insofar as they impose limitations on 
the collection (and subsequent use of ) personal information. Instead of 
being based on the type of device or communication system being used 
to collect data, they focus on the nature of the data in question and 
whether or not it relates to an individual who is identified or potentially 
identifiable. Schwartz & Solove refer to this concept as “personally 
identifiable information”.76
The concept of regulation via fair information principles has its 
origins in the United States in a report by the Advisory Committee 
on Automated Personal Data Systems in the Department of Health, 
Education and Welfare.77 These principles formed the basis for the public 
sector regime in the Privacy Act in the United States78 and also for the 
76. Paul M Schwartz & Daniel J Solove, “The PII Problem: Privacy and a 
New Concept of Personally Identifiable Data” (2011) 86:6 New York 
University Law Review 1814.
77. US, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Report of the 
Secretary’s Advisory Committee on Automated Personal Data Systems, Records, 
Computes and the Rights of Citizens (No (OS) 73-94) (Washington DC: 
DHEW Publication, 1973).
78. 5 USC § 552a (1974) [US Privacy Act].
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Safe Harbor principles79 administered by the Federal Trade Commission, 
as well as for the many data protection regimes that exist throughout the 
world.80 
The United States is unusual in terms of its lack of any FIP-based 
regime of general application to the private sector, although the FIPs 
form the basis for many federal and state laws81 and are summarised in 
set of principles developed by the FTC to provide guidance concerning 
privacy-friendly, consumer-oriented data collection practices.82 
The federal public sector Privacy Act83 regulates information handling 
by federal agencies via a Code of Fair Information Practice.84 It requires 
inter alia that agencies must “collect information to the greatest extent 
practicable directly from the subject individual when the information 
79. Full details about this regime can be accessed online: US, Federal Trade 
Commission, “U.S.-E.U Safe Harbor Framework” (FTC, 25 July 2016), 
online: FTC <https://www.ftc.gov/tips-advice/business-center/privacy-
and-security/u.s.-eu-safe-harbor-framework>. It should be noted that the 
Safe Harbor Framework is no longer legally recognised as adequate under 
EU law for transferring personal data to the US and that the US and EU 
have now negotiated a new Privacy Shield Network, see “Privacy Shield 
Framework” International Trade Administration, online: ITA <https://
www.privacyshield.gov/welcome>. The latter contains further additional 
protections.
80. For a useful overview of the evolution of laws based on FIPs see Fred 
Cate, “The Failure of Fair Information Practice Principles” in Jane K 
Winn, ed, Consumer Protection in the Age of the ‘Information Economy’ 
(Abingdon: Taylor and Francis, 2006) 341 [Cate, “Fair Information 
Practice Principles”].
81. See e.g. The Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 USC § 1681 (1970); Right to 
Financial Privacy Act, 12 USC § 3401 (1978); Electronic Communications 
Privacy Act of 18 USC §§ 2510-252 (1986). For a useful overview of a 
number of FIP-based laws in the US, see Schwartz & Solove, supra note 
76.
82. US, Federal Trade Commission, Privacy Online: A Report to Congress (June 
1998) at 7–14.
83. US Privacy Act, supra note 78.
84. US, Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Secretary’s Advisory 
Committee on Automated Data Systems, Records, Computers, and the 
Rights of Citizens, Code of Fair Information Practice (HEW, July 1973).
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may result in adverse determinations about an individual’s rights, 
benefits, and privileges under any Federal program”.85 It also prohibits 
the maintenance of any record “describing how any individual exercises 
rights guaranteed by the First Amendment unless expressly authorized 
by statute or by the individual about whom the record is maintained or 
unless pertinent to and within the scope of an authorized law enforcement 
activity”.86
The Privacy Act generally applies only to systems of records — i.e. 
“a group of any records under the control of any agency from which 
information is retrieved by the name of the individual or by some 
identifying number, symbol, or other identifying particular assigned to 
the individual”.87 The term “record” is defined as:
[A]ny item, collection, or grouping of information about an individual that is 
maintained by an agency, including, but not limited to, his education, financial 
transactions, medical history, and criminal or employment history and that 
contains his name, or the identifying number, symbol, or other identifying 
particular assigned to the individual, such as a finger or voice print or a 
photograph.88 
In Albright v United States89 the court held that a videotape of a meeting 
qualified as record as it contained a means of identifying an individual by 
picture or voice and that it contravened the Act by showing an individual 
exercising their First Amendment rights (by making complaints about 
their employment).90 The court also held that it did not matter in that 
case that the videotape was not maintained in a system of records, as this 
specific prohibition applied to agencies more generally.
In Australia, the Privacy Act91 was once similarly confined to the 
85. US Privacy Act, supra note 78, § 552a(e)(2).
86. Ibid, § 552a(e)(7).
87. Ibid, § 552a(a)(5).
88. Ibid, § 552a(a)(4).
89. 631 F (2d) 915 at 920 (DC Cir 1980) (US).
90. This case is discussed in Robert Gellman, “A General Survey of Video 
Surveillance Law in the United States” in Sjaak Nout, Berend de Vries 
& Corien Prins, eds, Reasonable Expectation of Privacy?: Eleven Country 
Reports on Camera Surveillance and Workplace Privacy (The Hague: TMC 
Asser Press, 2005) 7.
91. Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) (Austl) [Austl Privacy Act].
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public sector, but it now applies also to the private sector and has recently 
been amended to include a single set of Australian Privacy Principles 
(“APPs”) that apply to information handling by both sectors.92 The 
application of the APPs to the private sector is, however, subject to a 
large number of exceptions, including exceptions for the journalistic 
practices of media organisations93 and for acts of individuals acting in a 
non-business capacity.94
The APPs govern the handling of “personal information”, which is 
defined as information or an opinion about an identified individual, or 
an individual who is reasonably identifiable.95 This is a new definition96 
that has been designed to require “a consideration of the cost, difficulty, 
practicality and likelihood that the information will be linked in such a 
way as to identify [the individual]”.97 This has the effect that the records 
of surveillance are not covered by the Act unless they contain images 
or other data that allow for recognition of the individuals to which 
92. The Privacy Act is supplemented by laws that operate in a similar way in 
relation to most government agencies in most states and the Northern 
Territory: Privacy and Personal Information Protection Act 1998 (NSW) 
(Austl); Information Act 2000 (NT) (Austl); Information Privacy Act 2009 
(Qld) (Austl); Personal Information Protection Act 2004 (Tas) (Austl); 
Privacy and Data Protection Act 2014 (Vic) (Austl). There is a detailed 
overview of the Privacy Act in Moira Paterson, “Privacy” in Matthew 
Groves, ed, Modern Administrative Law in Australia: Concepts and Context 
(Port Melbourne: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
93. Austl Privacy Act, supra note 91, s 7B(4).
94. Ibid, s 7B(1).
95. Ibid, s 6(1).
96. It was amended by the Privacy Amendment (Enhancing Privacy Reform) Act 
2012 (Cth) (Austl).
97. Austl, Commonwealth, Australian Law Reform Commission, For Your 
Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice (Report No 108) 
(ALRC, 2008) at 6.57. This approach is consistent with that taken by the 
Victorian Civil and Administrative Tribunal in interpreting a similar (but 
not identical) provision in the Information Privacy Act 2000 (Vic) (Austl): 
See WL v La Trobe University, [2005] VCAT 2592 (Austl). For a further 
discussion of the Australian provisions, see Mark Burdon & Paul Telford, 
“The Conceptual Basis of Personal Information in Australian Privacy Law” 
(2010) 17:1 Murdoch University, Electronic Journal of Law 1.
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they relate, or unless they have been collected in a context in which the 
collecting organisation can readily link them to other data that identifies 
an individual. 
This issue has arisen for consideration in recent litigation concerning 
an application made under the Privacy Act for access to the applicant’s 
mobile network data. In Telstra Corporation Ltd v Privacy Commissioner, 
the Commonwealth Administrative Appeals Tribunal found against 
the applicant on the ground that this data did not constitute “personal 
information”.98 In the tribunal’s view, the metadata in question was “all 
about the way in which Telstra delivers the call or the message. That is 
not about Mr Grubb”.99 This decision was upheld by the Full Court of 
the Federal Court of Australia, which expressed the view that the words 
“about an individual” in the definition of personal information raised 
a threshold question that needed to be addressed before it could be 
determined whether that individual is identified or identifiable.100 In the 
court’s view, it was necessary in every case to consider whether each item 
of personal information requested, individually or in combination with 
other items, was “about an individual”. This would “require an evaluative 
conclusion, depending upon the facts of any individual case, just as a 
determination of whether the identity [could] reasonably be ascertained 
will require an evaluative conclusion”.101
The APPs include a collection limitation principle, which requires 
that personal information be collected fairly and legally102 and precludes 
the collection of personal information unless it is reasonably necessary for 
one or more of the functions or activities of the organisation collecting 
it.103 They also include further principles relating to open and transparent 
98. [2015] AATA 991.
99. Ibid at para 112.
100. Privacy Commissioner v Telstra Corporation Ltd, [2017] FCA 4 at para 89.
101. Ibid at para 63; See also Normann Witzleb, “‘Person Information’ under 
the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) – Privacy Commissioner v Telstra Corporation 
Ltd [2017] FCAFC 4” (2017) 45:2 Australian Business Law Review 188.
102. Australian Privacy Principles, APP 3.5, being Schedule 1 of the Privacy Act 
1988 (Cth) (Austl).
103. Ibid, APP 3.2.
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management,104 notification of the collection of personal information,105 
limitations on use and disclosure,106 requirements to maintain security107 
and integrity108 and obligations to provide access to information 
subjects.109
Oversight of the Privacy Act is provided by the Office of the Australian 
Information Commission. The Commissioner’s functions are grouped 
within the Act according to whether they foster compliance (via the 
provision of guidance),110 monitor compliance111 or support compliance 
(via the provision of advice).112 The Act is enforced primarily via a 
complaints-based system, although the Information Commissioner also 
has power to conduct audits to assess entities’ maintenance of personal 
information,113 to require provision of privacy impact assessments114 and 
to conduct “own motion” investigations.115
Canada differs in that it has separate federal privacy regimes. The 
Privacy Act116 and the Personal Information Protection and Electronic 
Documents Act117 govern the information handling practices of the 
federal government and private organisations, respectively. These both 
require compliance with sets of FIPs that apply in respect of “personal 
information”. The latter is defined as “information about an identifiable 
104. Ibid, APP 1.
105. Ibid, APP 5.
106. Ibid, APP 6.
107. Ibid, APP 10.
108. Ibid, APP 11.
109. Ibid, APP 12.
110. Ibid, s 28.
111. Ibid, s 28A.
112. Ibid, s 28B.
113. Ibid, s 33C.
114. Ibid, s 33D(1); A “privacy impact assessment” means a written assessment 
that identifies the impact an activity or function might have on the 
privacy of individuals and sets out recommendations for managing, 
minimising or eliminating that impact: Also see ibid, s 33D(3).
115. Ibid, s 40.
116. Privacy Act, RSC 1985, c P-21 [Canada Privacy Act].
117. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c 5 
[PIPEDA].
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individual”.118 Both Acts are subject to oversight by the Office of the 
Privacy Commissioner of Canada.
A problem with laws based on FIPs is that they depend on the criterion 
of personally identifiable information (“PII”) to establish their boundaries. 
As explained by Schwartz and Solove, without these boundaries “privacy 
rights would expand to protect a nearly infinite array of information, 
including practically every piece of statistical or demographic data”.119 
However, the criterion of identifiability is inherently fluid and whether 
or not information is reasonably identifiable depends on how much 
effort is put into the process, to what extent linkage with other available 
information is relevant and the extent to which it is appropriate to 
consider new and emerging identification technologies. Furthermore, 
determining where precisely to set the boundaries for identifiability raises 
difficult policy issues given that information that qualifies as personal 
information is generally subject to the full spectrum of requirements set 
out in the legislation.
Take, for example, a CCTV image of someone who is not immediately 
identifiable but who may be identified if face recognition technology is 
applied to the footage. From a privacy perspective, collection per se is of 
minimal privacy invasiveness if the footage is simply kept for a period 
to determine if it is required, say, to assist in the detection of pilfering, 
and then disposed of without that individual ever having been identified. 
However, if that image qualifies as personal information based on the fact 
that the individual could be identified, the collector would be required 
to provide access to it on request — a requirement which might be quite 
onerous depending on the ease of location of the image required and the 
need to protect the identities of any other persons who feature in the same 
footage (assuming that their images also qualify as personal information). 
On the other hand, if it does not qualify as personal information, the 
collector will not be under any obligation to keep the footage secure and 
would not be precluded from disclosing it to another individual who may 
have some means of recognising the individual. 
118. Canada Privacy Act, supra note 116, s 3; PIPEDA, ibid, s 2(1).
119. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 76 at 1866.
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A test based on identifiability also creates problems for the reasons 
suggested by Ohm — i.e. that the science of reidentifiability increasingly 
undermines processes of anonymization by deleting from information 
personal identifiers such as names and context specific identifiers such 
as identity numbers, account numbers, etc.120 Millard and Hon have 
likewise commented that “scientific and technological advances are 
making it increasingly simple to de-anonymise data to ‘re-identify’ 
individuals, notwithstanding the use of methods such as aggregation or 
barnardisation”121 and that this may mean that “almost all data could 
qualify as ‘personal data’, thereby rendering PII meaningless as a trigger 
for data protection obligations”.122
Another issue identified by Cate is that the effectiveness of current FIP-
based laws depends on a control-based system that relies on procedures 
designed to maximise individual control, for example, via requirements 
for notice and consent.123 However, consent has become an increasingly 
artificial construct given the complexity of the “surveillant assemblage” 
and the fact that individuals have little prospect of understanding the 
significance of individual data disclosures. Furthermore, “[n]otices are 
frequently meaningless because individuals do not see them or choose to 
ignore them, they are written in either vague or overly technical language, 
or they present no meaningful opportunity for individual choice”.124
120. Paul Ohm, “Broken Promises of Privacy: Responding to the Surprising 
Failure of Anonymization” (2010) 57:6 UCLA Law Review 1701.
121. Barnardisation is “[a] method of disclosure control for tables of counts 
that involves randomly adding or subtracting 1 from some cells in 
the table”: See online: “Glossary of Statistical Terms” Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (9 November 2005), online: 
OECD <stats.oecd.org/glossary/detail. asp?ID=6887>.
122. Christopher Millard & W Kuan Hon, “Defining ‘Personal Data’ in 
E-Social Science” (2011) 15:1 Information, Communication & Society 
66 at 77. 
123. Cate, “Fair Information Practice Principles”, supra note 80 at 341. 
124. Ibid at 3.
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V. The Significance of Constitutional/Human 
Rights Frameworks
A difficulty in providing effective regulation of public place surveillance 
is that laws that provide strong privacy protections may be viewed as 
undermining the freedom of the press/freedom of speech to the extent 
that they restrict the surveillance that facilitates the dissemination of 
personal information about individuals. 
Constitutional frameworks play an important role in determining the 
nature and extent of the privacy regulation that is possible. This is most 
evident in the United States, where the strength of the First Amendment 
protection of free speech and the lack of equivalent protection of 
informational privacy beyond the specific context of search and seizure 
creates major difficulties. It is also the case in other countries, such as 
Canada125 and New Zealand,126 which have human rights laws that 
lack express privacy guarantees. The European Human Rights regime, 
which provides specific protection for privacy, as well as for freedom of 
expression, provides greater flexibility.127
However, it is arguable that the interests served by effective regulation 
of surveillance are in many cases identical to those which underlie the 
important right to free speech. As identified many years ago by Regan, 
privacy has suffered due to its conception as an individual right, which 
125. The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution 
Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1892, c 11, 
contains a right to “freedom of thought, belief, opinion and expression, 
including freedom of the press and other media of communication” (s 
2(b)) and a right “to be secure against unreasonable search or seizure (s 8), 
but no general right to privacy”.
126. The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (NZ), 1990/109 contains a right 
to “freedom of expression, including the freedom to seek, receive, and 
impart information and opinions of any kind in any form” (s 14) and a 
right to be “secure against unreasonable search or seizure, whether of the 
person, property, or correspondence or otherwise” (s 21), but not any 
right to privacy more generally.
127. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 
4 November 1950, 213 UNTS 221 at 223 arts 8–10 (entered into force 3 
September 1953).
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means that it fares badly when it conflicts with competing rights that are 
traditionally conceived of as serving broader public purposes.128
The individualistic view of privacy is frequently articulated in the 
language of a negative freedom (i.e. as a freedom from interference by 
other people)129 and one that is in essence “anti-social” and pertaining to 
the “right of an individual to live a life of seclusion and anonymity, free 
from the prying curiosity which accompanies both fame and notoriety”.130 
However, privacy may equally be conceived of as a positive claim to 
a status of personal dignity, premised on the ability to exercise some 
element of control over one’s own personal information. In that sense it 
is not “simply an absence of information about us in the minds of others. 
Rather, it is the control we have over information about ourselves”.131
Moreover, while there can be no doubt that a right to privacy is 
an integral feature of liberal democratic systems that value individual 
autonomy and dignity (in particular, the right to be treated as a human 
being and not some abstract object), privacy also serves broader societal 
goals. As explained by Raab, in the context of surveillance, lack of privacy 
disrupts communication, resulting in an isolation that is inconsistent 
with democracy;132 “participatory freedoms require a degree of privacy” 
(as illustrated by the nexus between free elections and secret ballots).133
It follows, therefore, that it is erroneous to conceive of anti-surveillance 
laws as necessarily contravening free speech protection or overstepping a 
permissible balance between privacy and freedom of expression. That is 
128. Priscilla Regan, Legislating Privacy: Technology, Social Values, and Public 
Policy (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1995).
129. See Isaiah Berlin, “Two Concepts of Liberty” in Isaiah Berlin, ed, Four 
Essays on Liberty (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1969) 15, online: 
University of Hamburg <www.wiso.unihamburg.de/fileadmin/wiso_vwl/
johannes/Ankuendigungen/Berlin_twoconceptsofliberty.pdf>.
130. Louis Nizer, “The Right of Privacy: A Half Century’s Developments” 
(1941) 39:4 Michigan Law Review 526 at 528.
131. Charles Fried, “Privacy” (1968) 77:3 Yale Law Journal 475 at 482.
132. Charles Raab, “Privacy, Democracy, Information” in Brian Loader, ed, 
The Governance of Cyberspace: Politics, Technology and Global Restructuring 
(London: Routledge, 1997) 153 at 157.
133. Ibid at 160.
30 
 
Paterson, Regulating Surveillance
not to suggest that there is not potential conflict between the two, rather 
that it is important to bear in mind that failure to prevent the process of 
modulation described by Cohen in many respects renders meaningless 
the protection of the right to speech.
VI. Insights From Regulatory Theory
The theory of responsive regulation developed by Ayers and Braithwaite 
contends that: 
the achievement of regulatory objectives is more likely when agencies display 
both a hierarchy of sanctions and a hierarchy of regulatory strategies of 
varying degrees of interventionism. ... Regulators will do best by indicating a 
willingness to escalate intervention up those pyramids or to deregulate down 
the pyramids in response to the industry’s performance in securing regulatory 
objectives.134
This is further explained on the basis that “[t]he pyramidal presumption 
of persuasion gives the cheaper, more respectful option a chance to work 
first. More costly punitive attempts at control are thus held in reserve 
for the minority of cases where persuasion fails”.135 The regulatory 
pyramid136 therefore has softer measures such as warnings, persuasion 
and collaboration at its base, followed by civil sanctions and then criminal 
sanctions at its apex.
Telecommunications interception and surveillance device laws 
generally rely on the impositions of criminal sanctions. These have 
a strong deterrent effect but require a high standard of proof for 
convictions and rely on police for their enforcement. This is not 
necessarily conducive to good outcomes, as illustrated by the Murdoch 
media scandal in the United Kingdom. The regulatory pyramid suggests 
that criminal sanctions should be used only as a last resort in respect of 
more egregious conduct and that they are inherently unsuitable as a sole 
or primary device for achieving across-the-board regulatory outcomes in 
134. Ian Ayers & John Braithwaite, Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992) at 5–6.
135. John Braithwaite, “Responsive Regulation and Developing Economies” 
(2006) 34:5 World Development 884 at 887.
136. Ayers & Braithwaite, supra note 134 at 39.
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the surveillance context.
Common law and statutory torts focus instead on providing 
appropriate remedies for individuals who are adversely affected by non-
compliance. However, they produce a deterrent effect only to the extent 
that individuals are able to identify those responsible for privacy breaches 
that have caused (or are likely to cause) them harm and are then willing 
to litigate, bearing in mind that litigation may of itself be harmful to their 
privacy. Also they are likely to have a deterrent effect only if the damages 
available are sufficiently large to outweigh the potential profits to be 
gained from non-compliance. Furthermore, the fact these torts are 
available only to provide redress in respect of the types of harm that 
are capable of attracting legal compensation means that they are not well 
suited to addressing the harms inherent in the processes of modulation. It 
is arguable, therefore, that this purely private focus limits their usefulness 
as a sole or primary device for regulating surveillance.
On the other hand, data protection regimes provide for a more 
flexible range of regulatory options, including ones at the softer end of 
the spectrum (for example, education and persuasion) and scope for 
remedial action that is not based on individual action. Depending on 
how they are structured, they may include regulators with broad powers, 
including powers to conduct own motion investigations and to provide 
compensation, as well as civil and criminal penalties for more egregious 
or harmful conduct. They therefore offer broad scope for a regulatory 
solution that incorporates a pyramid of enforcement measures; one 
which can be tailored to address both the private and the broader public 
harms created by untrammelled public place surveillance. 
VII. A Suggested Way Forward
The flexibility inherent in data protection regimes suggests that they offer 
the best starting point for regulation of surveillance, provided that they 
include independent regulators who have a range of softer and harder 
enforcement powers at their disposal and who are both able, and prepared 
to make use of, their more coercive powers in those instances where the 
softer measures have failed to elicit compliance. As noted by Ayers and 
Braithwaite:
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[T]he greater the heights of tough enforcement to which the agency can 
escalate (at the apex of its enforcement pyramid), the more effective the agency 
will be at securing compliance and the less likely that it will have to resort to 
tough enforcement. Regulatory agencies will be able to speak more softly when 
they are perceived as carrying big sticks.137
It is also important to find means of addressing the weaknesses identified 
above, and especially the issue of PII. As noted above, whether or not 
information qualifies as PII provides the touchstone for the application 
of an entire set of FIPs, including limitations on collection, use and 
disclosure, security requirements and obligations to provide rights of 
access and amendment. Their wording and interpretation therefore 
remain a matter of continuing controversy. 
A prime example is the decision of the United Kingdom Court 
of Appeal in Durant v Financial Services Authority,138 in which the 
expression “personal data” in the Data Protection Act139 was interpreted as 
requiring an assessment of relevance or proximity to an individual. This, 
in turn, required assessment of whether the information is “biographical 
in a significant sense, that is, going beyond the recording of the putative 
data subject’s involvement in a matter or an event that has no personal 
connotations”;140 and whether it has “the putative data subject as its focus 
rather than some other person with whom he may have been involved or 
some transaction or event in which he may have figured or have had an 
interest”.141 
This test has been legitimately criticised on the basis that it eliminates 
the key obligations imposed under the Data Protection Act, including 
“fair processing, data security and no unreasonable data retention” as well 
as the rights of persons whose images are collected to control how they 
137. Ibid at 6.
138. [2003] EWCA Civ 1746 [Durant].
139.  Data Protection Act 1988 (UK), c 29.  
140. Durant, supra note 138 at para 28.
141. Ibid. See further Lilian Edwards, “Taking the ‘Personal’ Out of Personal 
Data: Durant v FSA and its Impact on the Legal Regulation of CCTV” 
(2004) 1:2 Script-ed 346. 
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are processed.142 However, it is arguable that the test made sense in the 
context of the specific situation in which the applicant was requesting 
access to all documents in which he was featured and that the preferable 
way forward is to incorporate different tests based on the specific practices 
that are in issue and their potential privacy implications for information 
subjects. 
Schwartz and Solove take a similar approach in arguing for 
reconceptualization of PII tests to resolve the reidentification issues 
identified by Ohm. They propose the development of a new model termed 
“PII 2.0”, which provides different regulatory regimes for information 
about identified and identifiable individuals.143 They suggest that, while 
all of the FIPs should apply to information about identified individuals, 
only some should apply to identifiable data.144 They further suggest 
that “[f ]ull notice, access, and correction rights should not be granted 
to an affected individual simply because identifiable data about her are 
processed” and also that “limits on information use, data minimalization, 
and restrictions on information disclosure should not be applied across 
the board to identifiable information”.145
This suggests a useful way forward, although the distinction between 
identified and identifiable is a blunt one and fails to answer the question: 
identified by whom and in what circumstances? What is important at the 
end of the day is whether or not data collected is handled in ways that 
pose an actual or potential threat to the data subject.
Take, for example, the hypothetical scenario of a marine researcher 
who incidentally captures images of Angelina Jolie on a boat when 
collecting images of wave movements from a fixed camera. It is arguable 
that the researcher should not be subject to collection limitation, access and 
amendment principles, although they should be required either to redact 
the images or to hold them securely. On the other hand, the researcher 
142. Lilian Edwards, “Switching Off the Surveillance Society? Legal Regulation 
of CCTV in the United Kingdom” in Nout, de Vries & Prins, supra note 
90 at 101.
143. Schwartz & Solove, supra note 76.
144. Ibid.
145. Ibid at 1880.
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should be subject to a broader range of principles if he or she wishes to use 
the images or disclose them to others. The key objective of this approach 
is to ensure that data that can potentially identify an individual receives 
protection only where necessary to protect the individual’s privacy and 
also to provide an incentive to organisations to deidentify or destroy such 
data where it is not collected for the purpose of collecting information 
about the individual. It is important to remember that the appropriate 
disposal of personal data once it is no longer required for the purposes 
for which it was collected is fundamental for the protection of privacy, 
although it strikes at the underlying rationale of the Big Data movement. 
Departure from the current “one size fits all” approach may also 
provide a useful way forward in dealing with the problem that the use of 
privacy invasive technology is no longer the sole domain of governments 
and business organisations. FIP-based regimes are currently ill-suited to 
the regulation of the non-business activities of individuals. However, 
there may be scope for the development of a more simplified set of 
principles that focus on privacy invasive uses and disclosures of personal 
information. 
A second major issue identified by Cate is that most FIP-based 
regimes rely heavily on notice and content requirements, resulting in 
“an avalanche of notice and consent requirements” that are generally 
ignored.146 He has therefore proposed an alternative set of rules based 
on principles of harm prevention, benefit maximisation and consistent 
protection.147 Building on this approach, Cate, Cullen and Schonberg 
have proposed a revised set of OECD Guidelines, which have been 
informed by a working group organised by the Oxford Internet Institute 
on behalf of Microsoft.148 
Cate’s approach is to try and shift the emphasis away from control 
by data subjects and onto accountability on the part of the organisation 
146. Cate, “Fair Information Practice Principles”, supra note 80 at 361.
147. Ibid at 370–74.
148. Fred H Cate, Peter Cullen & Victor Mayer-Schönberger, “Data 
Protection Principles for the 21st Century: Revising the 1980 OECD 
Guidelines” Oxford Internet Institute (March 2014), online: OII <www.oii.
ox.ac.uk/news/?id=1013>. 
35(2018) 4 CJCCL
involved in handling personal data. It also, however, reduces existing 
limitations on the secondary uses of data and imposes regulation only to 
the extent that information handling is clearly harmful to information 
subjects. In that sense, it shifts the balance in favour of Big Data while 
retaining a safety net to catch activities that are clearly harmful and 
disproportionate in their privacy invasiveness.
This development has been criticised by Cavoukian, Dix and El 
Eman149 on the basis that diluting consent requirements weakens privacy 
protection. They acknowledge the modern reality that individuals are not 
only confused by lengthy privacy notices but often also unaware of the 
data collection taking place or that they may be completely absent from 
the transaction which requires the processing of their data. However, 
they point out that depriving individuals of control over the purposes 
for which their personal data is collected and used is not beneficial to 
them; “it makes them vulnerable to the judgement exercised by others — 
corporate and bureaucratic systems that already affect our lives, and over 
which we have little or no control”.150 They also highlight that “greater 
reliance on law and regulation alone to police “after-the-fact” abuses of 
personal data is a misguided strategy; and … that there is little consensus 
on defining “harms” or ways in which to measure or mitigate privacy 
harms”.151
Cavoukian and her co-authors suggest instead “a more robust user-
centric “Transparency and Control” model”152 based on seven principles 
of “Privacy by Design”. Their concept of “Privacy by Design” is based on 
the view that “[p]rivacy and data protection should be incorporated into 
networked data systems and technologies by default, and become integral 
to organizational priorities, project objectives, design processes, and 
149. Canada, Information and Privacy Commissioner, The Unintended 
Consequences of Privacy Paternalism, by Ann Cavoukian, Alexander Dix & 
Khaled El Emam (Toronto: 5 March 2014), online: University of Toronto 
<www.comm.utoronto.edu/~dimitris/JIE1001/levin4.pdf>.
150. Ibid at 4.
151. Ibid at 2.
152. Ibid at 13.
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planning operations”.153 “Privacy by Design” has the advantage that it 
imposes responsibility on those involved in the collection and processing 
of data to build in measures to protect the privacy of individuals and is 
embodied as a requirement in the General Data Protection Regulation, 
which will commence operation in the European Union in May of 
2018.154 However, there is still a lack of clarity as what precisely this 
concept requires, and there are difficulties in implementing it in a context 
where it is inherently difficult to reconcile privacy interests with the 
interests of the Big Data movement. 
A different approach based on the so-called “Right to be Forgotten” 
involves conferring on individuals specific rights to require the erasure 
of their personal information.155 This has some potential to restore some 
measure of control to the individual and is embodied as a requirement 
in the General Data Protection Regulation.156 However, a key shortcoming 
is that it relies on the individual for enforcement. This is problematic in 
a context where individuals are unaware of what information has been 
collected about them and how it is being used. 
It is suggested that a different approach which may hold promise, is to 
improve the transparency not just of the different aspects of information 
handling but also of the outcomes of that process. The process of 
modulation described by Cohen157 is harmful, at least in part, because 
153. Ibid at 15.
154. EC, Data Protection Regulation (EC) 2016/679 of 27 April 2016 on the 
protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data 
and on the free movement of such data, and repealing Directive 95/46/EC 
(General Data Protection Regulation), [2016] OJ, L 119/1 [General Data 
Protection Regulation]. It is required under art 25 in respect of “potentially 
high-risk processing activities”. 
155. For a useful discussion of the advantages of such a right, see Viktor 
Mayer-Schönberger, Delete: The Virtue of Forgetting in the Digital Age 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
156. General Data Protection Regulation, supra note 154. Article 17 confers a 
right of erasure in specific circumstances, including where the data is no 
longer necessary in relation to the purposes for which it was collected or 
otherwise processed. 
157. Cohen, “What Privacy is For”, supra note 30.
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of its normalisation and the fact that individuals are unaware of the 
extent to which they are being manipulated. The provision of additional 
information at that stage (for example, informing individuals who are the 
subject of targeted advertising of why it is that they are receiving specific 
advertisements) might go some way towards alleviating these issues. 
Providing increased transparency creates practical difficulties that are 
magnified in the context of activities based on Big Data Analytics, due 
to the complexities associated with making transparent the algorithms 
that are used to inform those activities. However, the fact that this task 
is difficult does not mean that it should not be attempted given the 
seriousness of the potential harm involved. Improving the transparency 
of the end products of surveillance arguably has the potential to produce 
more informed decision-making on the part of individuals than notices 
given at the point of information collection.
